How PlaNYC cleared the path – slowly -- for New York City's adoption of congestion pricing

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Executive summary

From the perspective of any point in time between December 2013, when Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg left office, and December 2024, the Bloomberg administration's second-term attempt to enact a congestion-pricing program -- a centerpiece of PlaNYC -- would have appeared to be one of the successful three-term administration's rare failures. Beginning in 2025, though, New York City drivers finally faced a toll to enter core Manhattan, and PlaNYC's role in enacting the program stopped looking like an end point of futility and began looking like a critical step on the long path to success. "The idea was ahead of its time," Bloomberg observed in 2022.[i]

Current and future elected officials, policymaking appointees, and staffers can extract lessons from PlaNYC's role in New York's decades-long saga to enact congestion pricing.

First, accomplishing something as controversial as a cordon toll, even in transit-dependent Manhattan, can take a long time – a time span not measured even by a three-term mayoral administration.

Second, short-term political disruption of an idea does not equal policy or legacy defeat. The Bloomberg administration and PlaNYC can take credit for a playing a major role in congestion pricing's eventual enaction, by having:

- normalized mainstream political, business and advocacy support for the idea of charging drivers to enter a congested area
- Identified and isolated political opponents of the idea
- most important, created the conditions on the ground – bus lanes, bike planes, pedestrian plazas, and traffic-enforcement cameras – that made it possible for congestion pricing to happen in practice and not just in theory.

Background: previous efforts to enact congestion pricing

The notion of charging car and truck drivers to pay a fee to enter the most congested parts of Manhattan did not materialize with PlaNYC's 2007 rollout. Beginning in the 1960s, when New York City began to turn away from making more space for the automobile and truck and toward rebuilding its long-neglected mass-transit system, congestion pricing emerged as a perennial –

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and perennially doomed – idea, in part because it makes intuitive sense. Even at the height of the automobile era in the twentieth century, more than three-quarters of people arrived in core Manhattan on some form of transit, not via a private motor car.

24-HOUR TOTALS 1924-1963, PERSONS AND VEHICLES
entering the hub on a typical business day (in thousands)

Persons by Mode	1924		1932		1940		1948		1956		1960		1963	
	No. of Persons	%	No. of Persons	%	No. of Persons	%	No. of Persons	%	No. of Persons	%	No. of Persons	%	No. of Persons	%
Autos & Taxis	299	10.6	430	15.9	503	15.4	577	15.7	736	22.2	886	25.9	752	22.9
Bus	-	-	40	1.5	150	4.6	290	7.8	243	7.4	243	7.3	252	7.6
Truck	82	3.5	86	3.2	116	3.5	80	2.2	92	2.8	88	2.6	94	2.8
Trolley	161	6.9	88	3.2	59	1.8	24	0.6	3	0.1	-	-	-	-
Rapid Transit	1,531	65.3	1,752	65.0	2,169	66.3	2,389	64.8	1,970	54.9	1,913	57.1	1,977	60.1
Railroad	217	9.3	216	8.0	206	6.3	283	7.6	233	7.0	203	7.0	177	5.4
Non-Rail Ferry	103	4.4	85	3.2	68	2.1	48	1.3	36	1.1	36	1.1	38	1.2
Totals	2,343		2,697		3,271		3,691		3,313		3,349		3,290	

Source: New York Metropolitan Transportation Council, 1963 Hub Bound Travel report.[ii]

In 1969, when Mayor John Lindsay asked labor negotiator and transportation expert Theodore Kheel to come up with ideas for revenues to subsidize transit, Kheel suggested "assessing a toll on various bridges now toll free."[iii] The bridges to which he referred connected New York's boroughs to Manhattan; tolling them would thus represent a de-facto, if crude, congestion charge, into the densest part of the city. "Should there be a variable toll system, heavier during rush hours …, and lower in the evening and weekends?" asked Maxwell Lehman, a former city administrator," in response to this idea.[iv] Nearly two decades later, another mayor, Ed Koch, speaking in 1987 before a House hearing on the environment held at Lower Manhattan's World Trade Center, proposed a $10 fee to enter Manhattan.[v] At that time, transportation commissioner Ross Sandler introduced the public to the formal economic term, mentioning "congestion pricing" as part of a "menu of options" to meet long-delayed federal deadlines to improve the city's air quality.[vi]

Michael Bloomberg began thinking about congestion pricing as he ran for the mayoralty in 2001. "Congestion pricing and improving pedestrian safety are two topics that need to be addressed," the then-candidate for office wrote to independent traffic engineer and former city traffic commissioner San Schwartz in May 2001.[vii] After winning election and taking office, in early 2002, in his first budget proposal, Bloomberg included $800 million in annual revenues expected by 2006 from congestion pricing.[viii]

These early nods at congestion pricing all foundered quickly, for a few reasons. First, throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, New York's mass-transit system and Manhattan's streetscape (including routes to Manhattan) did not provide adequate capacity for elected

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
officials to be able to make a convincing case that more people should choose a subway, bus, bicycle, or foot commute instead of a car commute. Second, New York City was not growing, or growing quickly enough, to make efficient allocation of scarce street space a priority. Third, the business and real-estate community opposed or was neutral to such ideas. Finally, no mayor put the idea of congestion pricing into a broader context of the city's overall goals.

PlanNYC initiative: putting congestion pricing in an environmental and growth context

In April 2007, on Earth Day, the Bloomberg administration began to put congestion pricing into this broader context, of ecologically responsible economic and population growth.

Announcing PlaNYC at the Museum of Natural History, the mayor observed that "as our city continues to grow, the cost of congestion to our health, to our economy and to our environment are only going to get worse. The question is not whether we want to pay, but how do we want to pay — with an increased asthma rate, with more greenhouse gases, with more wasted time, lost business and higher prices. Or do we charge a modest fee to encourage more people to take mass transit?" The administration proposed an $8 fee for drivers coming into Manhattan below 86th Street, with the proceeds funneling into a new city-controlled authority to fund transportation, mostly transit, investments.

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CONGESTION PRICING FEATURES	
Zone boundaries	Manhattan below 86th Street, except • West Street and West Side Highway • FDR Drive • Battery Park Underpass • Queensboro, Williamsburg, Manhattan andBrooklyn Bridges and their approaches.
Hours	6 am–6 pm, Monday–Friday (no charges on weekends)
Charges: autos	$8 daily charge to enter, leave, and move within the zone during charging hours $4 daily charge for travel only within the zone during charging hours
Charges: trucks	$21 daily charge to enter, leave, and move within the zone during charging hours $5.50 daily charge for travel only within the zone during charging hours
Trips bypassing the Zone	Drivers do not pay unless they enter the zone. For example, driving from Brooklyn to the Bronx on the Brooklyn Bridge and FDR Drive would still be free
Toll rebates for E-Z Pass users	E-Z Pass users paying bridge and tunnel tolls to enter the zone will be credited the amount of their round-trip tolls that day, up to $8. For example, an E-Z Pass driver who now uses the Battery Tunnel to enter and leave Manhattan will pay no additional charge, because the current round-trip toll they pay is already $8
Exemptions	No charges for: • Handicapped license plates • Emergency vehicles and transit buses • Yellow taxis and livery cabs
Collection technology	At-speed E-Z Pass readers will allow fee collection without slowing vehicles down. Vehicles not equipped with E-Z Pass will be recorded by cameras and drivers can pay the fee by phone, internet or at participating retailers within 48 hours.
Revenues	All net revenues will be dedicated 100% to transportation investments through the SMART Financing Authority
Operating entity	NYC Department of Transportation will control the system, which will be built and maintained by a contractor yet to be selected

Source: NYC Mayor's Office of Long-Term Planning and Sustainability

Source: PlaNYC.

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Between 2001, when Bloomberg was a candidate mulling over the idea of congestion pricing, and the Earth Day speech in 2007, several factors had changed to make this optimistic contextualization possible. First, it was clear that the long-term population and jobs growth trajectory the city had begun in 1980 would continue, and New York would need to plan for a bigger population (a projected nine million).


Total Population
New York City & Boroughs, 1900 to 2010

	New York City	Bronx	Brooklyn	Manhattan	Queens	Staten Island
1900	3,437,202	200,507	1,166,582	1,850,093	152,999	67,021
1910	4,766,883	430,980	1,634,351	2,331,542	284,041	85,969
1920	5,620,048	732,016	2,018,356	2,284,103	469,042	116,531
1930	6,930,446	1,265,258	2,560,401	1,867,312	1,079,129	158,346
1940	7,454,995	1,394,711	2,698,285	1,889,924	1,297,634	174,441
1950	7,891,957	1,451,277	2,738,175	1,960,101	1,550,849	191,555
1960	7,781,984	1,424,815	2,627,319	1,698,281	1,809,578	221,991
1970	7,894,862	1,471,701	2,602,012	1,539,233	1,986,473	295,443
1980	7,071,639	1,168,972	2,230,936	1,428,285	1,891,325	352,121
1990	7,322,564	1,203,789	2,300,664	1,487,536	1,951,598	378,977
2000	8,008,278	1,332,650	2,465,326	1,537,195	2,229,379	443,728
2010	8,175,133	1,385,108	2,504,700	1,585,873	2,230,722	468,730

Source: NYC Department of City Planning.

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
Series Id: SMU36935610500000001
Not Seasonally Adjusted
State: New York
Area: New York City, NY
Supersector: Total Private
Industry: Total Private
Data Type: All Employees, In Thousands



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Second, New York had spent the past two decades rebuilding its transit system to handle more capacity, and had already demonstrated that it could continue to grow its population and jobs without adding car trips to core Manhattan. By 2007, the number of people coming to core Manhattan by private motor vehicle had already peaked, even as the number of people coming via all other modes was growing. Manhattan was already proving that it could accommodate more people without accommodating more cars.

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Source: Author's calculations based on NYMTC data.

Finally, as PlaNYC pointed out, congestion pricing was no longer an alien notion, but a proven concept in a peer city to New York. London had begun its tolling program in 2003, and PlaNYC touted the straightforward results.

CHANGE IN TRAFFIC WITHIN LONDON'S CHARGING ZONE AFTER CONGESTION PRICING	
Automobiles	–34%
Heavy trucks	–7%
Vans	–5%
Buses	+21%
Taxis	+22%
Bicycles	+28%
ALL VEHICLES	**–12%**

Source: Transport for London

Source: PlaNYC.

PlaNYC initiative: consolidating business and advocacy support

PlaNYC benefited, too, from a new development after the turn of the millennium: instead of opposing any effort to toll vehicles coming to Manhattan, the city's big-business and real-estate community now supported it. In 2006, the year before PlaNYC's unveiling, the Partnership for New York City, New York's business lobby, produced a report called "Growth or Gridlock: The Economic Case for Traffic Relief and Transit Improvement for a Greater New York."[ix] This landmark study marshalled data to demonstrate that gridlock and congestion were harming the region's economy, and that congestion pricing, as demonstrated in London, was a tool to alleviate it.

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PlaNYC initiative: the role of Deputy Mayor Dan Doctoroff

PlaNYC represented the first time that a congestion-pricing proposal had the consistent, credible support of a top government official with business- and financial-industry experience and credibility. In 2006, the mayor transferred responsibility for the city's transportation portfolio to Dan Doctoroff, a former investment banker who had joined the administration in 2002 as deputy mayor for economic development to focus on preparing New York City for more sustainable growth.

As it produced its report, the Partnership worked closely with Doctoroff. Doctoroff further served as a liaison between the Partnership and the mayor, as the mayor digested the data and eventually agreed to revive his long-dormant support for the proposal. "We believed very strongly in the virtuous cycle of the successful city," Doctoroff later said. "Our goal was to see the city grow," but, "if we're gonna grow to nine million people, what does the city look like? ... we basically modeled out ... that every highway, every subway, every commuter rail line would be overtaxed, would have too many people on it. The MTA is underfunded, the highways will not have enough capacity."

As Bloomberg absorbed this information, in Doctoroff's recollection, the mayor said, "OK, what are the things we can do, to meaningfully lower the number of cars [and] invest in our mass-transit system?" Doctoroff noted to the mayor in answer that the "Partnership had been talking about congestion pricing" and "London had implemented congestion pricing." The latter fact meant that "there was a precedent for a city, not exactly like New York, but one similar," so "at least we had some information data." With the mayor's support, "we proposed it in PlaNYC," and then immediately secured Spitzer's support. "We did an amazing amount of work over the next 10 weeks or so" in "establishing models of, what every neighborhood, what every [state] Assembly district, [state] Senate district, how would they be affected by congestion pricing? ... we demonstrated on average that [only] five percent of all NYC residents drove into Manhattan, at the same time we also worked with the to build a package of enhancements to the subway system, to a lesser extent the commuter rail, [so] the 95 percent who didn't drive into Manhattan would benefit."[x]

Doctoroff's private-sector credibility helped convince several key decisionmakers, including then-Governor Spitzer (2007 – 2008) and future Governor David Paterson (2008), that enacting congestion pricing would not harm and indeed would help the city's economy.

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PlanNYC initiative: federal support

Bloomberg could also present his PlaNYC congestion-pricing proposal as a risk-free pilot from the city's perspective, paid for through a $354 million federal grant supported during the George W. Bush era's "Urban Partners Program," to encourage states and cities to experiment with market-based tolling to mitigate congestion. The granted was secured in August 2007, pending state approval of the program.

Congestion pricing's seeming PlaNYC-era demise: the state's refusal

Despite the support of two governors, the City Council (by a wide margin), the business community, and the transit and bicycling advocacy community, congestion pricing failed at the state level, with the state assembly speaker, Sheldon Silver (now deceased), refusing to hold a vote in either legislative session of 2007 and 2008.

The popular explanation for this failure, encouraged by the Bloomberg administration, is that this refusal was due to Silver's venality, as someone beholden to the parking-lot industry and uninterested in taking a principled political risk on a controversial policy; indeed, Silver would later be convicted of federal corruption on an unrelated matter.

The reality was more nuanced. As one assemblyman, David Weprin, later noted, Silver did not hold a vote in part because his members did not desire to go on the record on the matter. The intractable opposition of Richard Brodsky (now deceased), the assembly's longtime powerful chairman on corporations, authorities, and commissions, seemingly on honest philosophical grounds, also played a role.

Did the Bloomberg administration make mistakes? Probably, but they didn't matter

In hindsight, after the failure to achieve a vote in 2007 or 2008, it was easy to point to some potentially erroneous political strategies and tactics taken by the Bloomberg administration.

First, less than two years was simply too short a time to convince some critical coalitions, such as poorer minority communities outside of the congestion zone, that congestion pricing would not harm them and in fact would benefit them.

Second, the hard sell pushed by the Bloomberg administration, with public attacks on Silver and other recalcitrant lawmakers, may have backfired, as did the notion that if the state didn't act fast, it would lose out on expiring capital dollars: Silver appeared unmoved by the attempt to pressure him with a federal deadline.

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Third, the Bloomberg administration may have focused too much on the business community's support, and insufficiently on the support of groups advocating for more space on the streets for bicyclists and pedestrians.

Finally, the proposal to delineate the congestion zone at 86th Street – rather than just Midtown and lower Manhattan – added complexities to the program, including questions about whether the tens of thousands of residents on the Upper West and East Sides would have to pay a fee simply to exit their neighborhoods on an evening trip.

Bloomberg's real PlaNYC congestion-pricing problem: he represented the city, not the state

In reality, though, even if the Bloomberg administration had pursued a perfect strategy and set of tactics, it is unlikely to have succeeded.

The real hurdle wasn't political, but structural, in the context of New York City's permanent relationship as a subordinate to New York State. New York State is, by the powers of the state Constitution, in charge of all taxation powers, including congestion pricing. The state rarely gives up any power or revenue, whether that power or revenue is an old or a new one.

This lesson was foretold in history. In 1966, Mayor John Lindsay, in his first year in office, had proposed to the state to allow the city to take over the Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Authority's toll revenue, to use that money to subsidize the mass transit system. Lindsay's proposal failed in Albany. Yet the mayor had to watch as the governor, Nelson Rockefeller, seized an identical idea -- only executed and managed at the state level rather than the city level -- a year later.

Whether in 1966 or in 2007-2008, New York City was not going to convince New York State to give up control over the power to toll or the power to direct such tolling revenue to hand-picked mass-transit priorities.

Congestion pricing's eventual success: a legacy of the Bloomberg era

After congestion pricing's 2007-2008 defeat, the Bloomberg administration continued to executive the elements of PlaNYC under its control, including several elements that helped assure congestion pricing's eventual adoption.

First, the administration in 2007, under the leadership of new transportation commissioner Janette Sadik-Khan, appointed just as PlaNYC was finalized, began carving out space on the roadbeds of all five boroughs for new busways, bus lanes, and protected bike lanes. This reordering of the streets enabled future administrations to make a more credible argument that New Yorkers had plenty of alternatives to driving a car into Manhattan.

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Second, the Bloomberg administration succeeded in getting the state to approve speed cameras. This success accustomed New York drivers to camera-based surveillance and enforcement, and also helped assure safe-streets advocates that any higher speeds eventually achieved by congestion pricing wouldn't cause more injuries and fatalities.

Finally, the Bloomberg administration's financial support of the #7 train extension and its political support of the expansion of the Second Avenue Subway and of East Side Access, which brought Long Island Rail Road commuters directly to Manhattan's East Side, by 2015 and 2016 respectively, gave commuters even more options for coming to core Manhattan other than driving.


Furthermore, one idea cemented by supporters of the Bloomberg-era proposal in politicians' and journalists' minds also created the conditions for congestion pricing's eventual legislative success. Because of the Bloomberg administration's focus on Silver as they key actor who killed congestion pricing – and because of Silver's subsequent, though unrelated, federal corruption convictions – future opposition to congestion pricing became indelibly linked to corruption.

Exogenous factors also led New York politicians to turn once again toward congestion pricing by the late 2010s. First, the poorly regulated rollout of e-hail for-hire vehicles in the 2010s contributed to record-low speeds – below 5mph – on core Manhattan streets, making the congestion crisis a practical reality that hadn't existed even a few years before.

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The graphic below uses GPS data, collected from yellow taxis, as a proxy for travel speeds in both the Midtown Core and the CBD each month since 2010. This year speeds declined at a slower rate than in previous years. This year's declines were equal in both the CBD and the Midtown Core, 0.1 mph, though the Midtown core remained over 3 mph slower than the CBD. This shows a clear correlation between the two zones but also indicates that the Midtown core has a consistently higher degree of congestion than the CBD as a whole.

Midtown Core speeds are consistently 30% slower than CBD speeds



Source: NYC Mobility Report, August 2019.[xi]

Second, starting in 2017, the subways experienced a "summer of hell," which continued past the initial season for more than a year. Delays and disruptions of transit service forced then-Governor Andrew M. Cuomo to cast about for a source of revenue to increase maintenance and replacement investment in the region's transit system. Cuomo, in 2019, at the height of his political powers, eventually folded an official congestion-pricing proposal – a $15 per-car charge to raise $1.5 billion annually for transit.

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Cuomo had learned from the Bloomberg administration's experience with a reluctant state legislature. Though Brodsky was long gone, he folded the proposal into the state budget, rather than asking lawmakers to be on the record on a standalone congestion-pricing proposal. He further limited the congestion-pricing zone to Manhattan below 60th Street, thus neutralizing any opposition from residents of the Upper East or Upper West Sides who didn't want to find themselves living in the congestion zone.

How is congestion pricing working?

Congestion pricing worked well in 2025, its first year, with traffic and pollution declining.

Reduction in Vehicle Entries to the CBD in 2025

Daily average entries to the Central Business District (CBD) compared to a baseline of historical average entries from January 5, 2025 through the week of December 28, 2025.

The baseline CBD entries figure is a historical average of daily entries for a particular month, accounting for the variation in traffic that exists between different days of the week. Because of this variation, monthly baselines should not be used to compare to the number of entries on individual days – only weekly or monthly averages. The baselines are intended to measure reductions in vehicle entries during the tolling program's first year. This page is not updated for periods after December 2025. For more information on vehicle entries in 2026 and beyond, please visit the Vehicle Entries page.


Monthly Weekly

Month	Average Daily Entries	Daily Baseline (Historical Average)	Change from Baseline	Change from Baseline (%)	Total Fewer Entries per Month
January 2025	533,434	580,500	-47,066	-8%	-1,270,782
February 2025	541,229	613,900	-72,671	-12%	-2,034,788
March 2025	560,255	642,500	-82,245	-13%	-2,549,595
April 2025	568,143	644,400	-76,257	-12%	-2,287,710
May 2025	580,226	647,200	-66,974	-10%	-2,076,194
June 2025	570,327	662,400	-92,073	-14%	-2,762,190
July 2025	553,291	616,600	-63,309	-10%	-1,962,579
August 2025	553,218	641,300	-88,082	-14%	-2,730,542
September 2025	570,357	632,500	-62,143	-10%	-1,864,290
October 2025	571,770	638,800	-67,030	-10%	-2,077,930
November 2025	559,403	630,000	-70,597	-11%	-2,117,910
December 2025	538,033	616,300	-78,267	-13%	-2,426,277

Source: Metropolitan Transportation Authority.

Yet hints have emerged that a state-led program rather than a city-led program will lead to a future lack of flexibility that will prevent the program from working as well as it could. The program already appears to be falling short when it comes to reducing the number of for-hire vehicles on Manhattan's streets, for example, with no real change in trips between 2024, before congestion pricing, and 2025, after the program began.

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Source: MTA.

A city-led program might implement a higher fee on for-higher vehicles to deter trips in the congestion zone. Further, the city has no way to experiment with different iterations of reducing demand, for example, potentially raising the toll on pollution-alert days or on special-event days.

On the other hand, recent city proposals point up the need for an outside body – e.g., the state -- to provide some discipline against New York City's sometimes populst impulses. For example, the state-controlled MTA has resisted the current mayor's proposal to make all buses free, an idea that would harm the MTA's long-term revenue streams independent of congestion pricing. The structural hurdle preventing former Mayor Bloomberg from implementing a congestion toll to fund mass transit without the state's permission also works the other way: the city cannot unilaterally reduce mass-transit fees without the state's permission.

Conclusion

Though Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg left office in 2013 without a successful congestion-pricing program in place, his spearheading of PlaNYC was a necessary, though not sufficient, factor in the congestion-pricing program that debuted in 2025. PlaNYC put congestion pricing into a context of sustainable growth.

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Bloomberg officials' campaigning for PlaNYC's congestion-pricing implementation during 2007 and 2008, though immediately unsuccessful, demonstrated that a sustained coalition of business and advocacy-group support could leverage further political support, including from two separate governors.

The successful city-led execution under Bloomberg and his successors of PlaNYC's other transportation initiatives -- including bus lanes, bike lanes, and greater camera enforcement of traffic laws -- also created the on-the-ground conditions to encourage more people to cycle and walk safety to and within core Manhattan, further hardening the post-Bloomberg coalition in favor of congestion pricing.

The lesson for future mayors, advisors, policymaking appointees and staff is that putting a controversial pricing proposal into a comprehensive long-term plan such as PlaNYC can ensure its future success, even if the immediate outcome appears to be the opposite.

PlaNYC offered enough redundancies and support for congestion pricing such that the successes that came out of the plan eventually created the foundation for tolling drivers to enter Manhattan and putting the proceeds toward mass transit.

The broadest lesson here is that without the physical infrastructure to support a pricing program's diversion of resistant commuters from cars to transit, the pricing program itself becomes untenable. Bloomberg's success was in moving forward with the physical infrastructure changes in PlaNYC even as the pricing change contemplated by PlaNYC remained untenable for another nearly two decades – but eventually became settled law and daily practice.

Sources
Previous on-the-record interviews on this topic: Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, Richard Brodsky, Majora Carter, Mayor Bill de Blasio, Dan Doctoroff, Charles Komanoff, John Liu, Alex Matthiessen, Amy Paulin, Ross Sandler, Polly Trottenberg, Janette Sadik-Khan, Sam Schwartz, David Weprin, Mark Weprin, Howard Wolfson, Kathy Wylde, et.al
Future interviews: Rit, Christine Quinn, Eliot Spitzer, David Paterson, former USDOT officials (to be suggested by Rit (hopefully))

[Scrap/later work to do below]
Some more on why US Department of Transportation supported - and the close coordination between US DOT and Bloomberg officials

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the legislature's creation of a Congestion Mitigation Commission and the endorsement of congestion pricing by Governor Spitzer – why, exactly did the council support it?

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[i] Author interview, March 2022.
[ii] https://www.nymtc.org/Utility-Menu/Archive/Data-and-Modeling-Archive/Hub-Bound-Travel-Archive
[iii] https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1969/08/05/89015751.pdf?pdf_redirect=true&ip=0
[iv] https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1969/08/13/89018510.pdf?pdf_redirect=true&ip=0
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[vii] Courtesy Sam Schwartz personal files.
[viii] https://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/15/nyregion/mayor-s-budget-proposal-transportation-mayor-looks-tolls-for-bridges-east-river.html?searchResultPosition=55.
[ix] file:///Users/nicolegelinas/Downloads/QAIkHHTW29CZoKXBp76qHNgUwg0.pdf
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[xi] https://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/downloads/pdf/mobility-report-singlepage-2019.pdf

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